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This paper introduces a logical model of inductive generalization, and speciﬁcally of the
machine learning task of inductive concept learning (ICL). We argue that some inductive
processes, like ICL, can be seen as a form of defeasible reasoning. We deﬁne a consequence
relation characterizing which hypotheses can be induced from given sets of examples, and
study its properties, showing they correspond to a rather well-behaved non-monotonic
logic. We will also show that with the addition of a preference relation on inductive
theories we can characterize the inductive bias of ICL algorithms. The second part of the
paper shows how this logical characterization of inductive generalization can be integrated
with another form of non-monotonic reasoning (argumentation), to deﬁne a model of
multiagent ICL. This integration allows two or more agents to learn, in a consistent way,
both from induction and from arguments used in the communication between them. We
show that the inductive theories achieved by multiagent induction plus argumentation are
sound, i.e. they are precisely the same as the inductive theories built by a single agent with
all data.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Inductive generalization is the basis for machine learning methods which learn general hypotheses from examples. How-
ever, with the exception of a few isolated proposals [1–4], there has been little effort towards speciﬁc logical models of
inductive generalization. The lack of a formal logical model of induction may have hindered the development of approaches
that combine induction with other forms of logical reasoning.
In this paper we do not tackle induction in its more general deﬁnition, but limit ourselves to inductive generalization,
and speciﬁcally, to the common task of inductive concept learning (ICL), which is the most well studied induction problem
in machine learning. We will argue that inductive generalization is a form of defeasible reasoning, and deﬁne an inductive
consequence relation (denoted by |∼) characterizing which hypotheses can be induced from given sets of examples, and
show its logical properties.
Relationships between inductive reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning have already been established by Flach in [1,5],
where he presents a logical analysis of induction and considers several postulates for a general inductive consequence
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[7]. However, while the work of Flach aims at deﬁning general rationality postulates for induction in general, our focus is
on characterizing a particular form of induction (ICL), which allows us to develop a more concrete model (see Appendix B
for an in-depth comparison of our proposal with Flach’s). Moreover, Flach presents a logical characterization of induction
focusing on hypothesis generation rather than hypothesis selection, i.e. intending to model which are the valid hypotheses one
can induce from a set of examples, but not which of those hypotheses is the best one. In this paper, within the framework of
ICL, we go one step further and propose that hypothesis selection can also be logically characterized by means of a preference
relation on inductive theories (suitable sets of hypotheses), and propose some preference relations which capture the typical
biases used in ICL algorithms (like parsimony or margin maximization).
There are two main implications of deﬁning a logical model of inductive generalization. First, it allows for a better
understanding of ICL algorithms, and second, it facilitates the integration of inductive reasoning with other forms of logical
reasoning, as we will show by integrating ICL with computational argumentation to deﬁne a model of multiagent ICL.
This paper extends the preliminary work in [8], modeling inductive generalization as a non-monotonic logic, extending the
properties satisﬁed, and using preference relations to model bias in ICL.
The second part of this paper presents an integration of two non-monotonic forms of reasoning: induction and argu-
mentation. This integration shows the advantage of having a logical model of induction. For instance, a multiagent induction
system such as [9] already introduced the idea of integrating inductive learning and argumentation in an implemented sys-
tems, but lacked any formal grounding for such an integration. In particular, in this paper we present a model of multiagent
ICL obtained by directly integrating our inductive consequence relation with computational argumentation. In this approach,
argumentation is used to model the communication between agents, and ICL models their internal learning processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem of inductive concept learning as
typically framed in the machine learning literature. Then, Section 3 introduces a logical model of induction and proposes
an inductive consequence relation, while Section 4 deals with preferences over inductive theories. In Section 5 we recall
basic notions of computational argumentation and we introduce the notion of argumentation-consistent induction. Next,
Sections 6 and 7 deﬁne a model of multiagent ICL by integrating our logical model of ICL with computational argumen-
tation. The paper closes discussing some related work and with the conclusions. We have also included two appendices:
Appendix A contains a generalization of Theorem 1 to n agents, and Appendix B provides more details on the comparison
of our inductive consequence relation with Flach’s previous work.
2. Background
Inductive concept learning (ICL) [10] using inductive techniques is not deﬁned formally in the literature of machine
learning; rather it is usually deﬁned as a task, as follows:
Given:
1. A space X of instances
2. A space of hypotheses or generalizations H , modeled as a set of mappings h : X → {0,1}
3. A target concept c, modeled as a partially known mapping c : X → {0,1}
4. A set D of training examples (for which c is known), where a training example is a pair 〈xi, c(xi)〉
Find A hypothesis h ∈ H such that h(x) = c(x) for each instance x in the set of training examples D
This strictly Boolean deﬁnition is usually weakened to allow the equality h(x) = c(x) not being true for all examples in
D but just for a percentage, and the difference is called the error of the learnt hypothesis.
Another deﬁnition of inductive concept learning is that used in Inductive Logic Programing (ILP) [11], where the back-
ground knowledge, in addition to the examples, has to be taken into account. Nevertheless, ILP also deﬁnes ICL as a task to
be achieved by an algorithm, as follows:
Given:
1. A set of positive E+ and negative E− examples of a predicate p
2. A set of Horn rules (background knowledge) B
3. A space of hypotheses H (a sublanguage of Horn logic language)
Find A hypothesis h ∈ H such that
• ∀e ∈ E+ : B ∧ h |
 e (h is complete)
• ∀e ∈ E− : B ∧ h |
 e (h is consistent)
These deﬁnitions, although widespread, are unsatisfactory and leave several issues without a precise characterization. For
example, the space of hypotheses H is usually expressed only by conjunctive formulas. However, most concepts need more
than one conjunctive formula (more than one generalization) but this is “left outside” of the deﬁnition and is explained as
1 A similar work for abductive reasoning is that of Pino-Pérez and Uzcátegui [6].
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that covers only part of the positive examples in D , proceeding then to eliminate the covered examples to obtain a new D ′
that will be used in the next step. Another example is that, typically, smaller hypotheses are preferred to longer hypotheses;
but again, that is left out of the deﬁnition.
In this paper our goal is not to provide a deﬁnition of the task of inductive concept learning, but to provide a logical
characterization of the inductive inference processes required for performing such task.
3. Inductive generalization for concept learning
Inductive generalization can be seen as having two main components: hypothesis generation and hypothesis selection
[1]. We will model the former using an inductive consequence relation, that deﬁnes which statements are valid inductive con-
sequences of given a set of examples, and the later using a preference relation, which determines which of those statements
are “better” than others. This section formally deﬁnes our inductive consequence relation.
3.1. An inductive consequence relation
In order to present our model of inductive concept learning, let us start by describing our language. There are three basic
elements in our language: examples, hypotheses (or generalizations) and background knowledge. We will use fragments
of ﬁrst-order logic as the representation language for these elements. Given that we focus on inductive concept learning,
hypotheses will basically be classiﬁcation rules (i.e. rules which classify an example as either belonging to the target concept
or not). Therefore, in the rest of this paper, the hypotheses induced from examples will be called rules.
We will use a distinguished unary predicate C to denote the target concept. Thus, we will write C(a) when the exam-
ple identiﬁed by the constant a belongs to the target concept, and ¬C(a) otherwise. Our formulas will be of two kinds:
examples, and rules.
• Examples will be conjunctions of the form ϕ(a)∧ C(a), where a is a constant, ϕ(x) is an arbitrary formula with x being
its only free variable. A positive example of C will be of the form ϕ(a)∧ C(a); a negative example of C will be of the form
ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a).
• Rules will be universally quantiﬁed formulas of the form (∀x)(ϕ(x) → C(x)), where ϕ(x) is an arbitrary formula with x
being its only free variable.
The set of examples will be noted by Le and the set of rules by Lr , and the set of all formulas of our language will be
L = Le ∪ Lr . In what follows, we will use the symbol  to denote derivation in classical ﬁrst-order logic. By background
knowledge we will refer to a ﬁnite set of formulas K ⊂Lr .
Let us assume that the similarity type of our ﬁrst-order language is ﬁnite (that is, we have a ﬁnite number of constants,
predicates and function symbols). We ﬁx a ﬁnite number of variables and we assume that all the variables contained in
the formulas (either in examples or in rules) are among these. Without loss of generality we can also assume that in
each formula (either in examples or in rules) there are not different quantiﬁer blocks with the same variable. Moreover,
we can assume also that, the variable x does not occur quantiﬁed in φ(x). For instance, we will not allow formulas like
φ(x) := (∀y)Ryx∧ (∃y)(∀x)T xy. Under these assumptions, using the fact that every ﬁrst-order formula is logically equivalent
to a prenex formula with the same free variables, it is not diﬃcult to check that there are only a ﬁnite number of (example
and rule) formulas modulo logical equivalence (see for instance [13, Chap. 2]). Therefore, we will assume that both Le and
Lr are ﬁnite.
The previously deﬁned notation allows us to deﬁne an inductive consequence relation between examples and rules. For
simplicity we will write α → β as a shorthand for the formula (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)).
Deﬁnition 1 (Covering). Given background knowledge K , we say that a rule α → C covers an example ϕ(a)∧ C(a) (or ϕ(a)∧
¬C(a)) when ϕ(a)∧ K  α(a).
Deﬁnition 2 (Inductive consequence). Given background knowledge K , a set of examples Δ ⊆ Le and a rule r = α → C , the
inductive consequence Δ |∼K α → C holds iff:
(1) (Explanation) r covers at least one positive example of C in Δ,
(2) (Consistency) r does not cover any negative example of C in Δ.
Notice that if we have two conﬂicting examples in Δ of the form ϕ(a)∧C(a) and ψ(b)∧¬C(b), and ϕ(a) is a less speciﬁc
description than ψ(a) (i.e. K  ψ(a) → ϕ(a)) then no rule α → C covering the example ϕ(a) ∧ C(a) can be inductively
derived from Δ. The next deﬁnition identiﬁes when a set of examples is free of these kind of conﬂicts.
Deﬁnition 3 (Consistent set of examples). A set of examples Δ is said to be consistent with respect to a concept C and background
knowledge K when: if ϕ(a)∧ C(a) and ψ(b)∧ ¬C(b) belong to Δ, then both K  ϕ → ψ and K ψ → ϕ .
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can be induced from Δ and K is IRK (Δ) = {(ϕ → C) ∈Lr | Δ |∼K ϕ → C}.
Notice that if Δ contains examples for a given concept C and also examples of ¬C , the set IRK (Δ) will contain both
rules that conclude C and rules that conclude ¬C . In general, IRK (Δ) contains rules that conclude every concept for which
there are examples in Δ. Also, notice that since Lr is ﬁnite, IRK (Δ) must also be ﬁnite. Next we show some interesting
properties of the inductive consequence |∼K .
Some formalizations of defeasible reasoning as non-monotonic logics, such as [14] and [7], consider Reﬂexivity, Left Logical
Equivalence and Right Weakening the basic properties without which a system should not be considered a logical system,
while others, such as [15], consider Reﬂexivity and Cut to be the basic properties of a logical system. Since our consequence
relation is deﬁned between two different sets of formulas (examples and rules), most of these properties do not directly
apply to our setting. Nevertheless, it is interesting to check whether the principles underlying these properties hold for our
consequence relation.
Intuitively speaking, the Left Logical Equivalence property expresses the requirement that logically equivalent formulas
have exactly the same consequences. In our framework, in order to evaluate this principle, we need to deﬁne ﬁrst the
notion of equivalent sets of examples.
Deﬁnition 5 (Equivalent sets of examples). Given background knowledge K , and two sets of examples Δ = Δ+ ∪ Δ− and
Γ = Γ + ∪ Γ − , where
Δ+ = {ϕ0(a0)∧ C(a0), . . . ,ϕk(ak)∧ C(ak)
}
Δ− = {ϕk+1(ak+1)∧ ¬C(ak+1), . . . ,ϕn(an)∧ ¬C(an)
}
Γ + = {φ0(b0)∧ C(b0), . . . , φl(bl)∧ C(bl)
}
Γ − = {φl+1(bl+1)∧ ¬C(bl+1), . . . , φm(bm)∧ ¬C(bm)
}
we say that Δ is equivalent to Γ modulo K , (Δ ≡K Γ ), iff
1. For every i  k, there is j  l such that K  ϕi → φ j ;
2. For every j  l, there is i  k such that K  φi → ϕ j ;
3. For every i > k, there is j > l such that K  ϕi → φ j ;
4. For every j > l, there is i > k such that K  φi → ϕ j .
Now we can show that, after suitable reformulations, Left Logical Equivalence and the rest of above mentioned properties
are satisﬁed.
Proposition 1. The inductive consequence relation |∼K satisﬁes the following properties:
1. Reﬂexivity: Assume that Δ is consistent w.r.t. C and K . If ϕ(a)∧ C(a) ∈ Δ, then Δ |∼K ϕ → C.
2. Left Logical Equivalence: If Δ |∼K α → C and Δ ≡K Δ′ , then Δ′ |∼K α → C.
3. Right Logical Equivalence: If K  β ↔ α and Δ |∼K α → C, then Δ |∼K β → C.
4. Cut: If Δ∪ {ϕ(a)∧ C(a), φ(b)∧ C(b)} |∼K α → C and K  ϕ → φ then Δ∪ {ϕ(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K α → C.
5. Cautious Monotonicity: If Δ |∼K α → C and Δ |∼K β → C, for every new constant b, Δ∪ {α(b)∧ C(b)} |∼K β → C.
6. Cautious Right Weakening: If K  α → β and Δ |∼K β → C, and α → C covers some positive example in Δ, then Δ |∼K α → C.
Proof.
1. Since ϕ(a)∧C(a) ∈ Δ and we obviously have ϕ(a)∧ K  ϕ(a), explanation trivially holds. Now assume ψ(a)∧¬C(a) ∈ Δ.
Then, since Δ is consistent w.r.t. C and K , ψ(a)∧ K  ϕ(a), hence consistency also holds.
2. By deﬁnition of covering, if a rule α → C covers a positive example of Δ, say ϕ(a) ∧ C(a), it covers any other example
φ(b) ∧ C(b) ∈ Δ′ such that K  ϕ → φ. By deﬁnition of equivalent sets of examples (modulo K ), at least one of such
examples belongs to Δ′ . An analogous argument holds for the negative examples.
3. By deﬁnition of covering, two logically equivalent rules (modulo K ) cover exactly the same positive and negative exam-
ples.
4. The reason is that, if the rule α → C covers the positive example φ(b)∧ C(b), since K  ϕ → φ, then α → C also covers
the positive example ϕ(a)∧ C(a).
5. By Deﬁnition 2 adding a positive example for an induced rule maintains the validity of that rule.
6. By Deﬁnition 2 the rule α → C clearly satisﬁes the explanation property. Moreover, α → C satisﬁes also the consistency
property: otherwise, since K  ϕ → φ, the rule β → C will cover a negative example, contrary to our assumption. 
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tuted by variables. This lifting is usually called in ICL literature the “single representation trick,” by which an example in the
language of instances (here Le) is transformed into an expression in the language of hypotheses (here Lr ).
The Right Logical Equivalence property expresses that one may replace logically equivalent formulas by one another on
the right of the |∼K . The Cut property expresses the fact that one may, in his way towards a plausible conclusion, ﬁrst add
a hypothesis to the facts he knows to be true and prove the plausibility of his conclusion from this enlarged set of facts
and then infer inductively this added hypothesis from the facts. Notice that the validity of Cut does not imply monotonicity.
Nevertheless, we have seen that a form of Cautious Monotonicity holds for our relation.
Observe also that the inductive consequence relation |∼K does not satisfy Right Weakening: If K  α → β and Δ |∼K β →
C , then Δ |∼K α → C . The reason is that, since α is more speciﬁc than β , the rule α → C may cover no positive example.
Right Weakening expresses the fact that one must be ready to accept as plausible consequences all that is logically implied
by what one thinks are plausible consequences. We have proposed instead a Cautious Right Weakening property as the one
that is relevant in our model.
Let us now analyze some additional properties, which are specially relevant for inductive concept learning.
Proposition 2. The inductive consequence relation |∼K satisﬁes the following properties:
1. If Δ |∼K α → C and K  α → ϕ then Δ |∼K ϕ → ¬C.
2. If Δ |∼K α → C and K  ϕ → α then Δ |∼K ϕ → ¬C.
3. Falsity Preserving: let r = α → C be such that it covers a negative example from Δ, hence r /∈ IRK (Δ); then r /∈ IRK (Δ ∪ Δ′) for
any further set of examples Δ′ .
4. Positive Monotonicity: Δ |∼K α → C implies Δ∪ {ϕ(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K α → C.
5. Negative Monotonicity: if ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a) ∈ Δ, Δ |∼K α → C implies Δ \ {ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a)} |∼K α → C.
6. Positive Non-monotonicity: if ϕ(a)∧ C(a) ∈ Δ, Δ |∼K α → C does not imply Δ \ {ϕ(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K α → C.
7. Negative Non-monotonicity:Δ |∼K α → C does not implyΔ∪{ϕ(a)∧¬C(a)} |∼K α → C, but it impliesΔ∪{ϕ(a)∧¬C(a)} |∼K
α → ¬C.
8. Generalization: if Δ = {ϕ(a)∧ C(a)} and Δ |∼K α → C then K  ϕ → α.
9. If Δ1 ∪Δ2 |∼K α → C then either Δ1 |∼K α → C or Δ2 |∼K α → C, that is, IRK (Δ1 ∪Δ2) ⊆ IRK (Δ1)∪ IRK (Δ2).
Proof.
1. Let us assume that K  α → ϕ and Δ |∼K ϕ → ¬C . Then, by Consistency, for all ψ(a) ∧ C(a) ∈ Δ we have ψ(a) ∧ K 
ϕ(a), and hence ψ(a)∧ K  α(a) as well. Then, clearly Δ |∼K α → C .
2. Let us assume now that K  ϕ → α and Δ |∼K ϕ → ¬C . Then, by Explanation, there exists ψ(a)∧ ¬C(a) ∈ Δ such that
ψ(a)∧ K  ϕ(a). But then we have ψ(a)∧ K  α(a) as well, so again Δ |∼K α → C .
3. Notice that if r covers a negative example of Δ, that particular example will remain in Δ∪Δ′ .
4. This property is stronger than Cautious Monotonicity, and follows by the same argument.
5. It is direct consequence that if α → C follows from Δ, it cannot cover any negative example.
6. Removing a positive example invalidates an inductive inference when that example is the only one covered the rule.
7. Δ |∼K α → C does not imply Δ∪ {ϕ(a)∧¬C(a)} |∼K α → C because nothing prevents ϕ(a)∧ K  α(a) to hold. The fact
that Δ∪ {ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a)} |∼K α → ¬C is there a consequence of Properties 3 and 1.
8. If Δ consists of only one positive example ϕ(a) ∧ C(a), the only way for α to cover ϕ(a) is that α (classically) follows
from ϕ .
9. Let r ∈ IRK (Δ1 ∪ Δ2) (see Deﬁnition 4). It means that r at least covers a positive example e+ ∈ Δ1 ∪ Δ2 and covers
no negative example of Δ1 ∪ Δ2, so it covers no negative example of both Δ1 and Δ2. Now, if e+ ∈ Δ1 then clearly
r ∈ IRK (Δ1); otherwise, if e+ ∈ Δ2, then r ∈ IRK (Δ2), hence in any case r ∈ IRK (Δ1)∪ IRK (Δ2). 
Let us now examine the intuitive interpretation of the properties in Proposition 2 from the point of view of ICL; for this
purpose we will reformulate some notions into the vocabulary commonly used in ICL.
Properties 1 and 2 state that by generalizing (resp. specializing) an induced rule will never conclude the negation of the
target concept. Property 3 states the well-known fact that induction is falsity preserving, i.e. once we know some induced
rule is not valid, it will never be valid again by adding more examples to Δ. Property 4 states that adding a positive
example e+ does not invalidate any existing induced rule, i.e. IRK (Δ) does not decrease; notice that it can increase since
IRK (Δ∪{e+}) might have induced rules that explain e+ that were not in IRK (Δ). Property 5 states that no negative example
can be covered if α → C follows from Δ. Property 6 states that when we remove the only positive example covered by the
rule, we invalidate the inductive inference.
Property 7 states that adding a negative example e− might invalidate existing induced rules in IRK (Δ), i.e. IRK (Δ ∪
{e−}) ⊆ IRK (Δ). This is related to Property 3, since once a negative example defeats an induced rule r, we know r will never
be valid regardless of how many examples are added to Δ. Property 8 states a generalization property, in the case where
Δ consists of only one positive example. Property 9 states that the rules that can be induced from the union of two sets of
examples are a subset of the union of the rules that can be induced from each of the sets.
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relation |∼K , as we will show presently. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that we don’t have any background
knowledge K .
Proposition 3 (Characterization). Let |≈ be a relation between consistent sets of examples for a concept C and rules satisfying the
following properties:
(P1) Reﬂexivity: if ϕ(a)∧ C(a) ∈ Δ then Δ |≈ ϕ → C.
(P2) Generalization: if Δ = {ϕ(a)∧ C(a)} and Δ |≈ α → C then  ϕ → α.
(P3) Negative Monotonicity: if Δ |≈ α → C and ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a) ∈ Δ, then Δ \ {ϕ(a)∧ ¬C(a)} |≈ α → C.
(P4) If Δ1 ∪Δ2 |≈ α → C then either Δ1 |≈ α → C or Δ2 |≈ α → C.
(P5) If Δ |≈ α → C and  α → ϕ then Δ |≈ ϕ → ¬C.
Then, it holds that Δ |≈ α → C iff α → C covers at least one positive example of C and does not cover any negative example of C in Δ,
as required by Deﬁnition 2.
Proof. In what follows, given a consistent set of examples Δ and a concept C , we will denote by Δ+ its subset of positive
examples for C in Δ, and by Δ− its set of negative examples. Assume Δ |≈ α → C , we have to prove that (i) α → C covers
some positive example in Δ and (ii) α → C does not cover any negative example.
(i) Using (P3) one can remove all negative examples from Δ but still preserving the consequence, i.e. we have Δ+ |≈ α → C .
Now, using (P4), we conclude that there must exist at least one positive example ϕ(a) ∧ C(a) ∈ Δ+ such that {ϕ(a) ∧
C(a)} |≈ α → C . Finally, by (P2), one has that  ϕ → α.
(ii) By contraposition. Assume α → C covers a negative example ψ(b)∧¬C(b) ∈ Δ− , and hence  ψ → α. By (P1), we have
Δ |≈ ψ → ¬C , and since  ψ → α, by (P5) we also have Δ |≈ α → C , contradiction. 
3.2. Inductive theories
The notions of inductive consequence and inducible rules allow us to deﬁne the idea of an inductive theory for a given
concept as a set of inducible rules which, together with the background knowledge, explain all the positive examples.
Deﬁnition 6 (Inductive theory). An inductive theory T for a concept C , w.r.t. Δ and K , is a subset T ⊆ IRK (Δ) such that all
the rules in T conclude C , and for all ϕ(a)∧ C(a) ∈ Δ, it holds that T ∪ K ∪ {ϕ(a)}  C(a). T is minimal if there is no T ′ ⊂ T
that T ′ is an inductive theory for C .
Since rules concluding C in IRK (Δ) do not cover any negative example of C , if T is an inductive theory for C w.r.t. Δ
and K , and ψ(a) ∧ ¬C(a) ∈ Δ for some constant a, then it holds that T ∪ K ∪ {ψ(a)}  C(a). Observe that, in the case that
Δ is a consistent set of examples, the existence of inductive theories is guaranteed due to the reﬂexivity property: the set
of all rules obtained lifting examples is an inductive theory. Notice also that the notion of inductive theory is relevant for
ICL because an inductive machine learning algorithm has as output a speciﬁc inductive theory.
3.3. Exempliﬁcation
The Zoology data set is a standard machine learning dataset containing 101 instances of animals associated with an
animal family (ﬁsh, insect, mammal, etc.). The goal is to learn general descriptions of each of the families by induction. For
exempliﬁcation purposes, we will use mammal as our target concept, represented by m. The Zoology dataset, as available
from the UCI machine learning repository, has no background knowledge so K = ∅. Let us now consider three animals in
Zoology (an aardvark, an antelope and a bass):
e1 := hair(a1)∧milk(a1)∧ predator(a1)∧ toothed(a1)
∧ backbone(a1)∧ breathes(a1)∧ fourlegged(a1)
∧ catsize(a1)∧m(a1)
= ϕ1(a1)∧m(a1)
e2 := hair(a2)∧milk(a2)∧ toothed(a2)∧ backbone(a2)
∧ breathes(a2)∧ fourlegged(a2)∧ tail(a2)
∧ catsize(a2)∧m(a2)
= ϕ2(a2)∧m(a2)
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∧ backbone(a3)∧ toothed(a3)∧ tail(a3)∧ ¬m(a3)
= ϕ3(a3)∧ ¬m(a3)
Given Δ = {ϕ1(a1)∧m(a1),ϕ2(a2)∧m(a2),ϕ3(a3)∧ ¬m(a3)}, to illustrate |∼K , we consider several hypotheses:
r1 := (∀x)
(
hair(x)∧milk(x) →m(x))
r2 := (∀x)
(
toothed(x)∧ backbone(x) →m(x))
r3 := (∀x)
(
tail(x)∧ domestic(x) →m(x))
r4 := (∀x)
(
fourlegged(x) →m(x))
• Δ |∼K r1, because both ϕ1(a1)  hair(a1) ∧ milk(a1) and ϕ2(a2)  hair(a2) ∧ milk(a2) (thus satisfying the explanation
condition) and ϕ3(a3)  hair(a3)∧milk(a3) (thus satisfying the consistency condition).
• Δ |∼K r2, because ϕ1(a1)  toothed(a1) ∧ backbone(a1), hence it satisﬁes explanation, but ϕ3(a3)  toothed(a3) ∧
backbone(a3), and thus it’s not consistent.
• Δ |∼K r3, because ϕ1(a1)  tail(a1) ∧ domestic(a1) and ϕ2(a2)  tail(a2) ∧ domestic(a2), i.e. it does not satisfy the expla-
nation condition. So, even if r3 satisﬁes the consistency condition, it does not explain any example.
• Δ |∼K r4, because both ϕ1(a1)  fourlegged(a1) and ϕ2(a2)  fourlegged(a2) (thus satisfying the explanation condition)
and ϕ3(a3)  fourlegged(a3) (thus satisfying the consistency condition).
In this example, the sets T1 = {r1} ⊆ IRK (Δ), T2 = {r4} ⊆ IRK (Δ) and T3 = {r1, r4} ⊆ IRK (Δ) are inductive theories of m
w.r.t. Δ. Clearly, only T3 is not minimal.
4. Preference over inductive consequences
Although many rules can be inductive consequences of a given set of examples, ICL algorithms have a set of preferences
and inductive biases that make them prefer some rules over the rest, or some inductive theories over the rest. For example,
rules that cover more positive examples are preferred over rules that cover less examples, shorter rules are preferred over
longer rules, and hypotheses with larger margins are preferred over those with smaller margins [16]. In our model of
inductive generalization we incorporate these criteria by means of a preference relation.
Depending on the bias we want to model, the preference relation might be deﬁned over rules or over inductive theories.
In either case, since preference might depend on both the set of examples Δ and background knowledge K , we will note
our preference relation by Δ,K .
When the preference is expressed over rules, we write r1 Δ,K r2 when r1 is at least as preferred as r2 (r1 >Δ,K r2 when
r1 is strictly preferred to r2). In general, this preference relation is only assumed to be a partial preorder in the set IRK (Δ).
Deﬁnition 7 (Preferred rules). The set of preferred rules IRK (Δ) = {r ∈ IRK (Δ) | r′ ∈ IRK (Δ): r′ >Δ,K r} is the subset of
inducible rules that are maximally preferred.
When the preference is expressed over inductive theories, we write T1 Δ,K T2 when T1 is at least as preferred as T2.
Again, in general, this preference relation is assumed to be only a partial preorder on the set of possible inductive theories.
Given that ICL algorithms ultimately return inductive theories, if the preference is expressed over rules, we are interested
in having a preference over inductive theories, which can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8 (Preference over inductive theories). Given a preference Δ,K over rules, an inductive theory T is preferred over
another theory T ′ , denoted T Δ,K T ′ , if there exist r ∈ T , r′ ∈ T ′ such that r Δ,K r′ , and for each r ∈ T there is no r′ ∈ T ′
such that r′ >Δ,K r.
Having a preference relation Δ,K on inductive theories allows us to deﬁne the following concepts of preferred and ideal
inductive theories.
Deﬁnition 9 (Preferred inductive theory). We say that an inductive theory T is (maximally) preferred with respect to Δ,K if
there is no other inductive theory T ′ ⊆ IRK (Δ) such that T ′ >Δ,K T .
Deﬁnition 10 (Ideal inductive theory). We say that an inductive theory T is ideal with respect to Δ,K if it is both maximally
preferred w.r.t. Δ,K and minimal.
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theory according to some unspeciﬁed criterion nor any other mathematical or algebraic meaning, it is just a shorthand to
denote an inductive theory that is minimal and maximally preferred (according to a given preference relation).
Next, we present two examples of how some typical biases of ICL techniques can be expressed using our framework.
4.1. Parsimony
Most ICL algorithms have a bias towards ﬁnding shorter hypotheses (i.e. Parsimony or Occam’s Razor), which typically
translates to more general hypotheses. We can formalize both notions using two preference relations.
Given a function size(T ), which returns the number of symbols required to express the inductive theory T in a given
logical language, we can deﬁne the preference T1 Δ,K T2 ⇔ size(T1) size(T2), which effectively captures the bias towards
shorter hypotheses.
A bias towards more general hypotheses is easier to express as a preference relation between rules. We can deﬁne the
preference relation α → C Δ,K β → C iff β ∧ K  α, i.e. the rule α → C is preferred to β → C if it is more general. Then,
using Deﬁnition 8, a preference over inductive theories can be established, as well as preferred (Deﬁnition 9) and ideal
(Deﬁnition 10) inductive theories.
4.2. Margin maximization
In machine learning, margin is commonly deﬁned as the distance from the examples to the decision boundary [16].
A classiﬁer which maximizes the margin has the decision boundary far away from every example; this ensures that small
variations in the training set do not result in misclassiﬁcations. Margin maximization is usually employed in machine
learning and pattern recognition techniques where instances are represented in metric spaces. We will show now that
an analogous principle can be applied for logic-based instance representation.
First, in order to use the notion of margin, we need to deﬁne some measure of distance, or similarity, between examples.
To formalize this notion, we assume for simplicity that all predicates in the language are unary and that examples ϕ(a) ∧
C(a) are such that ϕ(a) is a conjunction of literals, i.e. ϕ(a) is of the form p1(a) ∧ · · · ∧ pk(a) ∧ ¬pk+1(a) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬pn(a). In
that case, the only variable in a predicate stands for an example identiﬁer, and hence for our purposes here we can actually
consider these unary predicates as atomic propositions. Simplifying, we will denote by ϕ the propositionalized version of
ϕ(a), i.e. ϕ = p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk ∧ ¬pk+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬pn . This is indeed the case in the example described in Section 5. We will
further assume the set P of unary predicates (now propositional variables) we work with is ﬁnite.
Let Ω = {w :P → {0,1}} be the space of possible worlds. Given a propositional formula ϕ , we will denote by [ϕ] the set
of possible worlds satisfying the formula ϕ (according to classical propositional logic). We assume there is a distance func-
tion δ : Ω ×Ω →R+ . The intuition is that δ(w,w ′) evaluates how far or different two worlds w and w ′ are: δ(w,w ′) = 0
means that w = w ′ , 0 < δ(w,w ′) < 1 means that w resembles to w ′ to some degree. A usual choice for δ, among others
(see e.g. [17,18]), is the Hamming distance, that counts the number of elements of P over which two worlds differ.
Given such a distance function δ on the set of possible worlds Ω , the distance between two propositional formulas
built form P can be measured by the distance between the corresponding sets of possible worlds, using the well-known
Hausdorff distance derived from δ: δH (ϕ,ψ) =max(Iδ(ϕ | ψ), Iδ(ψ | ϕ)), where
Iδ(ϕ | ψ) = max
w∈[ψ] minw ′∈[ϕ]
δ
(
w,w ′
)
Now, given a set of examples Δ, a distance δ and a threshold τ ∈R+ , we can consider an expanded set of examples Δ∗τ
where for each ϕ(a) ∧ C(a) ∈ Δ (resp. ϕ(b) ∧ ¬C(b) ∈ Δ) we include all those additional ﬁctitious examples ψ(a′) ∧ C(a′)
(resp. ψ(b′)∧ ¬C(b′)), such that the distance between ψ and ϕ is at most τ , i.e. such that δH (ϕ,ψ) τ .
Given an inductive theory T ⊆ IRK (Δ), we say that T is valid to the level τ whenever T is also an inductive theory of
IRK (Δ∗τ ) (hence, in particular, Δ∗τ must be consistent). We assign a preference degree τ to an inductive theory T , noted
Pref (T ) = τ , when τ is the maximum for which T is still an inductive theory of IRK (Δ∗τ ) (i.e. Pref (T ) is the maximum
degree to which T is valid). This induces a natural preference over inductive theories: T Δ,K T ′ ⇔ Pref (T )  Pref (T ′).
Moreover, according to Deﬁnition 9, a preferred inductive theory T is one such that there is no other inductive theory
T ′ ⊆ IRK (Δ) such that T ′ >Δ,K T .
Notice that, in the present setting, a preferred inductive theory T maximizes the margin according to the distance δH .
As shown in Fig. 1, the reason is that Δ∗τ is expanding as much as possible around all positive examples ϕ(a) ∧ C(a) and
negative examples ϕ(b)∧ ¬C(b) without T covering any ﬁctitious example of the opposite sign.
4.3. Exempliﬁcation
Let us now illustrate the use of preferences by continuing the exempliﬁcation started in Section 3.3.
Let us consider again the inductive theories used before: T1 = {r1} ⊆ IRK (Δ), T2 = {r4} ⊆ IRK (Δ) and T3 = {r1, r4} ⊆
IRK (Δ), and consider a new inductive theory T4 = {r1, r5, r6}, where:
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r5 := (∀x)
(
hair(x)∧ fourlegged(x) →m(x))
r6 := (∀x)
(
milk(x)∧ fourlegged(x) →m(x))
Given a function size(·), counting the symbols in a formula (ignoring parenthesis), the size of an inductive theory is sim-
ply the sum of the sizes of its rules. Thus we have: size(r1) = 10, size(r4) = 7, size(r5) = 10, size(r6) = 10, and therefore:
size(T1) = 10, size(T2) = 7, size(T3) = 17, and size(T4) = 30. Using the parsimony preference we have: T2 Δ,K T1 Δ,K
T3 Δ,K T4. In fact, there is no other inductive theory with size smaller than 7, and thus T2 is a preferred inductive theory.
Since T2 is also minimal, it is actually an ideal inductive theory.
Notice, however, that if we were to use margin maximization as the preference criterion, with the Hamming distance,
T2 would not be preferred, since it is only valid to the level 0. In fact, the margin preference degrees of these inductive
theories are Pref (T1) = 0, Pref (T2) = 0, Pref (T3) = 0, Pref (T4) = 1 and, thus, T4 would be preferred to the others.
5. Induction and argumentation
One of the main advantages of having a logical model of induction is that it allows an easy integration of inductive
reasoning with other forms of logical reasoning. In order to illustrate its beneﬁts, this section presents a model of mul-
tiagent ICL obtained by directly integrating our inductive consequence relation with computational argumentation. In this
integration, argumentation is used to model the communication between agents, and ICL models their internal learning
processes.
For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we will consider a multiagent system scenario with two agents Ag1 and Ag2
having a same target concept C . However, as shown in Appendix A, our main theoretical result applies to the more general
case of an arbitrary number of agents. We make the following assumptions:
1. The background knowledge K of both agents is the same.2
2. The set of rules Lr and the set of examples Le are deﬁned as before (see Section 3).
3. Each agent has a set of examples Δ1,Δ2 ⊆Le such that Δ1 ∪Δ2 is consistent.
The goal of each agent Agi is to induce an inductive theory Ti such that Ti ⊆ IR(Δ1 ∪ Δ2) and that constitutes an
inductive theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪Δ2. We will call this problem multiagent ICL.
For this purpose, a naïve approach would be to have both agents sharing their complete sets of examples; however, that
might not be always feasible for a number of reasons, like cost or privacy. In this section, we will show that by sharing some
of the rules they have induced from examples (rather than all of their examples), two agents can also solve the multiagent
ICL problem. Let us start presenting our computational argumentation framework.
5.1. Computational argumentation
We will follow Dung’s abstract argumentation formalization [19] and deﬁne an argumentation framework as a pair A=
(Γ,), where Γ is a ﬁnite set of arguments, and  is an attack relation.
Given two arguments, r and r′ , we write r r′ to represent that r attacks r′ . Moreover, if both r r′ and r′ r we say
that r blocks r′ .
As in any argumentation system, the goal is to determine whether a given argument is defeated or not according to a
given semantics. In our case we will adopt the semantics based on dialectical trees [20,21] explained below:
2 For simplicity, since both agents share K and C , in the rest of this paper we will write IR(Δ) rather than IRK (Δ), and just say inductive theory, instead
of saying inductive theory of C .
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rooted in r0 is a sequence: such that:
1. ri+1 ri (for i  k),
2. if ri+1 ri and ri blocks ri−1 then ri  ri+1.
The argument rk is called the leaf node of λ.
Additionally, for the purposes of ICL, we will assume that the attack relation has no cycles (which is the case for the
deﬁnition of attack we will introduce later in this paper, Deﬁnition 12), and hence there are no repeated arguments in an
argumentation line. Consequently, argumentation lines are always ﬁnite by construction. The set Λ(r0) of maximal argu-
mentation lines rooted in r0 are those that are not subsequences of other argumentation lines rooted in r0. Clearly, Λ(r0)
can be arranged in the form of a tree, where all paths from the root to the leaf nodes exactly correspond to all the possible
maximal argumentation lines rooted in r0 that can be constructed in the given argumentation framework. In order to decide
whether r0 is defeated in A, the nodes of this tree are marked U (undefeated) or D (defeated) according to the following
(cautious) rules:
1. Every leaf node is marked U.
2. Each inner node is marked U iff all of its children are marked D, otherwise it is marked D.
Therefore, the arguments in the argumentation framework A will be either undefeated or defeated according to their
marking, as follows:
Undefeated: U(A) = {r ∈ Γ | r is marked U in the tree Λ(r)}
Defeated: D(A) = {r ∈ Γ | r is marked D in the tree Λ(r)}.
5.2. Argumentation-based induction
Induction and argumentation can be integrated through the notion of argumentation-consistent induction. While induction
was deﬁned with respect to a set of observations Δ, argumentation-consistent induction will be deﬁned with respect to a set
of observations Δ, and a set of arguments Θ . The essential idea is that we consider arguments to be rules, i.e. Θ ⊆ Lr (an
example can also be used as an argument through its corresponding lifted rule, see the reﬂexivity property in Proposition 1).
Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we will use the terms “rule” and “argument” interchangeably.
Given that arguments will be rules, we can now deﬁne the attack relation  between rules as follows.
Deﬁnition 12 (Attack). Given two rules r, r′ ∈ Γ , an attack relation r r′ holds whenever:
1. r = (∀x)(α(x) → (x)),
2. r′ = (∀x)(β(x) → ¬(x)), and
3. K  (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)),
where ¬ = ¬C when  = C and ¬ = C when  = ¬C .
Argumentation-consistent induction consists of inducing rules that agree with both Δ (i.e. not covering negative exam-
ples present in Δ) and Θ (i.e. not being defeated by the arguments in Θ).
Deﬁnition 13 (Argumentation-consistent inducible rule). A rule r ∈ IR(Δ) is argumentation-consistent with respect to a set of
arguments Θ if r ∈ U(A), where A= (Θ ∪ IR(Δ),).
The set of all the argumentation-consistent rules induced is AIR(Δ,Θ) = IR(Δ)∩U(A).
Now we can deﬁne argumentation-consistent inductive theories.
Deﬁnition 14 (Argumentation-consistent inductive theory). An argumentation-consistent inductive theory T , with respect to Δ
and a set of arguments Θ , is an inductive theory of Δ such that T ⊆ AIR(Δ,Θ).
In the multiagent context starting in the next section, the goal of an agent is to build an argumentation-consistent
inductive theory, where such theory will be composed by rules that have not been defeated by a set of arguments Θ
coming from another agent.
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6. Argumentation-consistent induction in multiagent systems
Let us now show how the notion of argumentation-consistent induction can be used to model induction in a scenario
with two agents. The main idea is that agents induce rules from the examples they know, and then they share them with
the other agent. Rules received from the other agent are added into the own agent’s argumentation framework to update
her argumentation-consistent induced rules. Thus, in addition to the set of examples Δi , each agent Agi has an individual
argumentation framework Ai , containing both (1) the set of inducible rules IR(Δ) inducted by Agi and (2) the set of
arguments Θ received from another agent.
Let us now prove that two agents communicating their induced rules and performing argumentation using the kind of
attack in Deﬁnition 12 would obtain the exact same set of inducible rules as a single agent knowing the examples known
to both agents.
Since the attack relation between rules is always the same, in the following we will simply write U(Γ ) instead of U(A)
to denote the set of undefeated rules of the argumentation system A= (Γ,).
Theorem 1 (Argumentation-consistent Induction). U(IR(Δ1)∪ IR(Δ2)) = IR(Δ1 ∪Δ2).
Proof. Notice that by deﬁnition U(IR(Δ)) = IR(Δ); consequently, we have AIR(Δ, IR(Δ)) = IR(Δ).
First, we prove that IR(Δ1 ∪ Δ2) ⊆ U(IR(Δ1) ∪ IR(Δ2)). Let r ∈ IR(Δ1 ∪ Δ2) then r = α → C covers a positive example of
Δ1 ∪ Δ2 and does not cover any negative example of Δ1 ∪ Δ2. W.l.o.g., assume the covered positive example is from Δ1.
Then r ∈ IR(Δ1). Suppose there exists a rule r′ = β → ¬C ∈ IR(Δ1) ∪ IR(Δ2) such that r′ r, i.e. such that K  β → α. It is
clear that r′ /∈ IR(Δ1), hence assume that r′ ∈ IR(Δ2). This means r′ covers a negative example δ− ∈ Δ2, but if r′ covers it,
r must cover δ− as well, contradiction.
Second, we prove that IR(Δ1 ∪ Δ2) ⊇ U(IR(Δ1) ∪ IR(Δ2)). Let r ∈ U(IR(Δ1) ∪ IR(Δ2)). W.l.o.g., assume r ∈ IR(Δ1). Then
r = α → C covers a positive example of Δ1 and does not cover any negative example of Δ1. Assume also, looking for a
contradiction, that r /∈ IR(Δ1 ∪ Δ2). Since we have assumed that r ∈ IR(Δ1), this means that r covers a negative example
of Δ2. This negative example can be specialized to a rule r′ = β → ¬C ∈ IR(Δ2) such that K  β → α. Since r′ is the
specialization of an example in Δ2 and Δ1∪Δ2 is consistent, the rule r′ is undefeated. Consequently, r /∈ U(IR(Δ1)∪ IR(Δ2)),
which contradicts our original assumption. Therefore we can conclude IR(Δ1 ∪Δ2) ⊇ U(IR(Δ1)∪ IR(Δ2)). 
The previous theorem shows that, given two agents, Ag1 and Ag2, each one with sets of examples Δ1 and Δ2 re-
spectively, they can induce the same set of rules either by sharing their induced rules IR(Δ1) and IR(Δ2) and then using
argumentation, or by exchanging all of their examples and then using induction. This equivalence is illustrated in Fig. 2, that
shows two equivalent approaches to obtain an inductive theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪Δ2: centralized induction (on the left hand side),
and argumentation-consistent induction (on the right hand side). In Appendix A of this paper, we show how this result
applies to the more general case of an arbitrary number of agents.
Clearly, sharing the complete IR(Δi)’s is not a practical solution either, since a) they can be very large, and b) given the
reﬂexivity property, IR(Δi) contains Δi . Nevertheless, Theorem 1 shows that theoretically, the problem of multiagent ICL
can be modeled using individual induction plus argumentation. In fact, if the purpose is ﬁnding inductive theories, not all
arguments in the IR(Δi)’s need to be exchanged. Section 7 presents a dialogue game that ﬁnds an inductive theory w.r.t.
Δ1 ∪Δ2 using the same theoretical idea as used in Theorem 1, but focusing on exchanging a smaller subset of rules.
However, let us ﬁrst illustrate the concepts of argumentation-consistent induction described in this section with an
exempliﬁcation.
6.1. Exempliﬁcation
Consider two agents, Ag1 and Ag2, knowing a set of examples Δ1 = {e1, e2, e4} and Δ2 = {e5, e6, e7}. Here, e1, e2 and e3
are the three examples used in Section 3.3, and the new four examples (e4 is a sealion, e5 is a seasnake, e6 is a platypus,
and e7 is a chicken) are deﬁned as:
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e4 := hair(a4)∧milk(a4)∧ aquatic(a4)∧ predator(a4)∧ toothed(a4)
∧ backbone(a4)∧ breathes(a4)∧ ﬁns(a4)∧ twolegged(a1)
∧ tail(a4)∧ catsize(a4)∧m(a4)
= ϕ4(a4)∧m(a4)
e5 := aquatic(a5)∧ predator(a5)∧ toothed(a5)∧ backbone(a5)
∧ venomous(a5)∧ ﬁns(a5)
∧ tail(a5)∧ ¬m(a5)
= ϕ5(a5)∧ ¬m(a5)
e6 := hair(a6)∧ eggs(a6)∧milk(a6)∧ aquatic(a6)∧ predator(a6)
∧ backbone(a6)∧ breathes(a6)∧ fourlegged(a6)∧ tail(a6)
∧ catsize(a6)∧m(a6)
= ϕ6(a6)∧m(a6)
e7 := feathers(a7)∧ eggs(a7)∧ airborne(a7)∧ backbone(a7)
∧ breathes(a7)∧ twolegged(a7)∧ tail(a7)∧ ¬m(a7)
= ϕ7(a7)∧ ¬m(a7)
Thus, Δ1 contains three positive examples (e1, e2 and e4) and no negative example, and Δ2 contains two negative
examples (e5 and e7) and one positive example (e6). Let us now consider some of the rules that the agents can induce from
those examples. For instance, two of the rules that Ag1 can induce are r1, r3 ∈ IR(Δ1) below:
r1 := (∀x)
(
backbone(x) →m(x))
r3 := (∀x)
(
backbone(x)∧ toothed(x)∧ twolegged(x) →m(x))
Agent Ag2 can induce the rule r2 ∈ IR(Δ2):
r2 := (∀x)
(
backbone(x)∧ toothed(x) → ¬m(x))
When the two agents perform induction in isolation, no issues are found with those three rules, as shown in Fig. 3. However,
let us consider now the situation where agent Ag1 communicates r1 and r3 to Ag2, and Ag2 communicates r2 to Ag1. In
this situation, according to Deﬁnition 12, the following attacks hold: r2 r1 and r3 r2.
Let us ﬁrst consider Ag1, who, in addition to its inducible rules IR(Δ1), now has access to the set of rules Θ2→1 = {r2}.
Now, to perform argumentation-consistent induction, Ag1 assesses which are the rules that are both inducible from Δ1
and consistent with Θ2→1. For that purpose, Ag1 constructs the argumentation framework A1 = (IR(Δ1) ∪ {r2},). It is
easy to verify that, since r2 is attacked by r3, and r3 is not attacked by any other rule, r2 is defeated. Thus, both r1 and
r3 are argumentation-consistent inductions and belong to AIR(Δ1,Θ2→1). Therefore, knowing r2 does not change the set of
inducible rules of Ag1, even if r2 attacks r1 (see Fig. 4).
Now, considering agent Ag2, in addition to its inducible rules IR(Δ2), now Ag2 has access to the set of rules Θ1→2 =
{r1, r3}. Similarly as before, to perform argumentation-consistent induction, Ag2 assesses which are the rules that are both
inducible from Δ2 and consistent with Θ1→2. Ag2 constructs the argumentation framework A2 = (IR(Δ2) ∪ {r1, r3},). In
this case, the rule r2, induced by Ag2 is defeated (because it is attacked by r3, which is not attacked by any other rule), and
thus r2 /∈ AIR(Δ2,Θ1→2). Thus, in this case, knowing r1 and r3 changes the set of inducible rules of Ag2.
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7. Reaching inductive theories in multiagent concept learning
While Theorem 1 shows that it is possible to solve the problem of multiagent ICL using individual induction plus ar-
gumentation, this section shows that when agents want to just agree on a single inductive theory, it is not necessary, in
general, to exchange all of their induced rules. This section presents a dialogue game [22] through which two agents can
solve the multiagent ICL problem by communication, speciﬁcally by exchanging some of the rules they induced from exam-
ples. To deﬁne the dialogue game, we need to deﬁne an interaction protocol, including the types of messages that agents
are allowed to use, and the conditions under which types of messages can be exchanged. The dialogue game is deﬁned for
two agents Ag1 and Ag2, each of which has an individual set of examples Δ1, Δ2, and consists of a series of rounds. At
each round t of the dialogue game, each agent Agi holds a current inductive theory, T ti , that is revised after each round.
When the game terminates, both agents reach a common inductive theory with respect to Δ1 ∪Δ2.
During the dialogue game, agents communicate to each other rules induced from their examples. Through this rule
exchange, an agent Agi may attack the inductive theory T tj of the other agent Ag j if it is not consistent with Δi .
At the end of each round t , an agent Agi knows the following six pieces of information, namely (Δi, T ti , T
t
j,Θ
t
i→ j,
Θtj→i,Ati ), where:
1. Δi is the set of examples known to Agi .
2. T ti is the current inductive theory w.r.t. Δi that agent Agi is holding.
3. T tj is the current inductive theory w.r.t. Δ j that the other agent is holding.
4. Θti→ j is the set of arguments (rules) that agent Agi has sent to Ag j up to the round t . Notice that Θ
t
i→ j ⊆ IR(Δi).
5. Θtj→i is the set of arguments (rules) that agent Agi has received from Ag j up to the round t .
6. Ati = (IR(Δi)∪Θtj→i,) is the argumentation framework for Agi ; notice that the set of arguments is composed of the
rules inducible by Agi plus the arguments sent by the other agent Ag j .
Let us now provide some auxiliary deﬁnitions, before we introduce the dialogue game interaction protocol.
Deﬁnition 15 (Defeaters of a rule). Given an argumentation framework A= (Γ,), and a defeated argument r ∈ D(A), the
set of defeaters of r is:
Defeaters(r,A) = {r′ ∈ Γ ∣∣ r′ r and r′ ∈ U(A)}
That is to say, the set of undefeated arguments that attack r.
Deﬁnition 16 (Defeated arguments from communication). Given the set of arguments Θtj→i communicated by Ag j to Agi , the
set of those received arguments that are defeated according to Agi is Dtj→i = D(Ati )∩Θtj→i .
Using the previous deﬁnitions, we can now present the dialogue game through which two agents Ag1 and Ag2 can ﬁnd
an inductive theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪Δ2.
Before the ﬁrst round, at t = 0, the two agents are assumed to hold initial inductive theories T 01 ⊆ IR(Δ1) and T 02 ⊆ IR(Δ2)
w.r.t. Δ1 and Δ2 respectively. Moreover, we assume each agent has communicated its own inductive theory to the other
agent, and thus:
Θ01→2 = T 01 and Θ02→1 = T 02
Consequently, the initial argumentation systems of the agents are set to:
A0 = (IR(Δ1)∪Θ0 ,
)
and A0 = (IR(Δ2)∪Θ0 ,
)1 2→1 2 1→2
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values at the previous round (T t−1i ,Θ
t−1
i→ j,At−1i ). Notice that Δi does not change and T tj and Θtj→i are computed by the
other agent.
Actually, each round t  1 of the protocol is divided in ﬁve simple steps: generate attacks, send attacks, update inductive
theories, send updated inductive theories, and update state. The process ends when no agent generates new attacks. In more
detail, a round t of the protocol is as follows:
1. Generate Attacks: Agi generates a set of attacks Rti by selecting a single argument (whichever) r′ ∈ Defeaters(r,At−1i )
for each r ∈ Dt−1j→i i.e. Agi selects one attack for each argument r sent by the other agent that is defeated according to
Agi .
2. Send Attacks: Each agent Agi sends Rti to the other agent.
If Rti =Rtj = ∅, then the process terminates, since this means that the current theories held by each agent (T t−1i and
T t−1j ) are acceptable for the other agent (no attack can be found). Otherwise the protocol proceeds to the next step.
3. Update Inductive Theories: Each agent Agi generates a new argumentation-consistent inductive theory T ti ⊆
AIR(Δi,Θ
t−1
j→i ∪Rtj) such that (T t−1i ∩ U(Bt−1i )) ⊆ T ti , where Bt−1i = (IR(Δi) ∪ Θt−1j→i ∪Rtj,)—i.e. the new theory T ti
contains all the undefeated rules from T t−1i taking into account the attacks received, and replaces the rules that were
defeated in T t−1i by new rules.
4. Send Updated Inductive Theories: Each agent Agi sends T ti to the other agent.
5. Update State: the set of arguments received by each agent is increased accordingly:
• Θt1→2 = Θt−11→2 ∪Rt1 ∪ T t1
• Θt2→1 = Θt−12→1 ∪Rt2 ∪ T t2
both agents update their argumentation frameworks:
• At1 = (IR(Δ1)∪Θt2→1,)• At2 = (IR(Δ2)∪Θt1→2,)
And new round t + 1 starts by going back to the ﬁrst step.
When the process terminates, both agents have a common and agreed argumentation-consistent inductive theory, namely
T ∗ = T t1 ∪ T t2.
The reason is that, when the process terminates, if the set Δ1 ∪ Δ2 is consistent, then each agent Agi has an
argumentation-consistent inductive theory T ti w.r.t. Δi that is also consistent with the examples in Δ j . Nevertheless, T
t
i
might not be an inductive theory w.r.t. Δ j , since there might be examples in Δ j not covered by T ti . However, their union
T ∗ = T t1 ∪ T t2 is an inductive theory w.r.t. the examples in Δ1 ∪ Δ2 and, since both agents know T t1 and T t2, both agents
can have T ∗ as a common and agreed argumentation-consistent inductive theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪ Δ2, as the following theorem
proves.
Theorem 2. If the setΔ1 ∪Δ2 is consistent, the previous process always ends in a ﬁnite number of rounds t, and when it ends, T t1 ∪ T t2
is an inductive theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪Δ2 .
Proof. First, let us prove that the ﬁnal theories (T t1 and T
t
2) are consistent with Δ1 ∪Δ2. For this purpose we will show that
the termination condition (Θt1→2 = Θt−11→2 and Θt2→1 = Θt−12→1) implies that the argumentation-consistent inductive theory
T ti found by agent Agi at the ﬁnal round t has no counterexamples in either Δ1 nor in Δ2.
Let us assume that there is an example ak ∈ Δ1 which is a counterexample of a rule r ∈ T t2. Because of the reﬂexivity
property, there is a rule rk ∈ IR(Δ1) which corresponds to that example. Since Δ1 ∪Δ2 is consistent, there is no counterex-
ample of rk , and thus rk is undefeated. Since rk r by assumption, r would have been defeated, and therefore rule r could
not be part of any argumentation-consistent inductive theory generated by Ag2. The same reasoning can prove that there
are no counterexamples of T t1 in Δ1 ∪Δ2.
Since T t1 and T2 are inductive theories w.r.t. Δ1 and Δ2 respectively, it follows from the above that T
t
1∪T t2 is an inductive
theory w.r.t. Δ1 ∪Δ2 because it has no counterexamples in Δ1 ∪Δ2, and every example in Δ1 ∪Δ2 is explained at least by
one rule in T t1 or in T
t
2.
Finally, the process has to terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, since, by assumption, IR(Δ1) and IR(Δ2) are ﬁnite sets,
and the sets Θt1→2 and Θt2→1 grow at least with one new argument at each round; however, since Θti→ j ⊆ IR(Δi), there is
only a ﬁnite number of new arguments that can be added to Θti→ j before the termination condition holds. 
Thus, we have shown that the inductive theories achieved by argumentation-consistent induction are sound. Theorem 1
has shown that the set of inductive theories that can be reached through sharing examples is the same as the set of
inductive theories that can be reached by sharing induced rules and then performing argumentation-consistent induction.
Furthermore, Theorem 2 shows that it is possible to reach one of those inductive theories by using a simple dialogue game
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examples into a single inductive process is no longer imperative, at least in ICL, since induction followed by argumentation
is a viable option.
The process to ﬁnd a multiagent inductive theory can be seen as composed of three mechanisms: induction, argumen-
tation and belief revision. Agents use induction to generate general rules from concrete examples, they use argumentation
to decide which of the rules sent by another agent cannot be defeated, and ﬁnally they perform belief revision when they
change their inductive theories in light of the arguments sent by another agent. The belief revision process is embodied in
the way the set of undefeated rules U(Ati ) changes from round to round, which also determines how an agent’s inductive
theory changes in light of the arguments shared by the other agent.
A particular implementation of this integration model is the A-MAIL framework [9], where two agents perform induction
on separate example sets and engage in argumentation until they reach individual inductive theories that are consistent with
their example sets. The A-MAIL framework offers a particular realization of three mechanisms of induction, argumentation
and belief revision. The need of having an argumentation-consistent inductive process is met by ABUI (Argumentation-based
Bottom-Up Induction), a new inductive method that ﬁnds inductive rules consistent with the set of undefeated rules at any
step of the argumentation process.
7.1. Exempliﬁcation
Let us assume we have two agents, Ag1 and Ag2 and let Δ1 = {e1, e2, e3} (containing the three examples used in
Section 3.3, an aardvark, an antelope and a bass), and Δ2 = {e4, e6, e7} (containing some of the examples used in Section 6.1,
a sealion, a platypus, and a chicken). Now, the two agents want to ﬁnd a common inductive theory of the concept mammal,
represented by the unary predicate m. Let us explain the process.
Before the protocol starts, at t = 0, each agent has individually found an inductive theory:
T 01 =
{
(∀x)(breathes(x) →m(x))}, and
T 02 =
{
(∀x)(aquatic(x) →m(x))}
Intuitively, since all the positive examples of mammal known to Ag1 are land animals, and all the negative ones are not,
Ag1 has induced that breathing is enough to characterize a mammal. A similar situation has occurred with Ag2, who has
ﬁnd by induction that being aquatic is enough to characterize a mammal, since it happens that the only two examples of
mammals Ag2 knows are aquatic.
Moreover, at t = 0, each agent has communicated to the other agent their individually found inductive theories and build
their initial argumentation systems, and thus:
Θ01→2 = T 01 , and Θ02→1 = T 02
A01 =
(
IR(Δ1)∪Θ02→1,
)
and A02 =
(
IR(Δ2)∪Θ01→2,
)
The protocol then proceeds as follows.
Round t = 1.
1. Agents proceed by generating attacks against the rules they have received they believe are defeated.
• Since the rule (∀x)(aquatic(x) → m(x)) generated by Ag2 is defeated according to Ag1, Ag1 selects one attack to
defeat it: R11 = {(∀x)(aquatic(x)∧ ¬hair(x) → ¬m(x))};• Since the rule (∀x)(breathes(x) → m(x)) generated by Ag1 is defeated according to Ag2, Ag2 selects one attack to
defeat it: R12 = {(∀x)(breathes(x)∧ feathers(x) → ¬m(x))}.
2. These attacks are sent to each other.
3. Agents update their theories:
• Due to the attacks received, Ag1 updates its inductive theory by removing all the defeated arguments, and replacing
them by new undefeated arguments, and generates: T 11 = {(∀x)(hair(x) →m(x))}.• Analogously, Ag2 updates its inductive theory by removing all the defeated arguments, and replacing them by new
undefeated arguments, and generates: T 12 = {(∀x)(milk(x) →m(x))}.
4. These theories are sent to each other.
5. Agents update their states:
• Θ11→2 = Θ01→2 ∪R11 ∪ T 11 ; Θ12→1 = Θ02→1 ∪R12 ∪ T 12 ;
• A11 = (IR(Δ1)∪Θ12→1,),A21 = (IR(Δ2)∪Θ11→2,).
Round t = 2.
1. Agents should try now to generate attacks, but since the arguments sent in the previous round R11 and R12 are un-
defeated in the argumentation systems A12 and A11 respectively, no new attacks can be generated and the protocol
ends.
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1
2 that are consistent with the whole set of examples
of both agents Δ1 ∪Δ2 (i.e. each theory has any counterexample neither in Δ1 nor in Δ2). Theorem 2 guarantees that
T ∗ = T 11 ∪ T 12 =
{
(∀x)(hair(x) →m(x)), (∀x)(milk(x) →m(x))}
is a common and agreed argumentation-consistent inductive theory. Notice that this result is reached without exchanging
any example, and exchanging a small amount of inducible rules.
8. Related work
Peter Flach [1] introduced a logical analysis of induction, focusing on hypothesis generation. In Flach’s analysis, induc-
tion was studied on the meta-level of consequence relations and focused on different properties that may be desirable for
different kinds of induction. In this paper we cover both hypothesis generation and hypothesis selection, but we focus in a
limited form of induction, namely inductive concept learning, extensively studied in machine learning. A direct difference
between Flach’s work and the research presented in this paper is that we impose strong syntactical constraints on our
inductive consequence relation (from sets of examples to rules), in order to focus on the speciﬁc machine learning problem
of inductive concept learning, whereas the work of Peter Flach, no restrictions were applied, in order to study the sound-
ness and completeness of sets of meta-level properties of inductive consequence relations. Appendix B offers an in-depth
comparison of some properties of our consequence relation with some of Flach’s meta-level properties.
A reﬁnement of Flach’s consistency-based conﬁrmation using Hempel’s direct conﬁrmation was studied in [4]. The au-
thors proposed that inductive generalization can be modeled as a deductive process given a completion technique, which
captures inductive assumptions, such as “every unknown individual is similar to the known ones.” The difference with our
work is that, albeit restricted to the particular task of ICL, we propose a speciﬁc non-monotonic logic consequence relation,
instead of resorting to a completion technique.
Related to the work of Flach is that of DelGrande [3], where he studied the algebra of hypotheses that can be formed
by induction from sets of examples. In the same way as Flach, DelGrande limited his study to hypothesis generation, and
considered that his model is a restriction with respect to the general problem of induction, where induction as such plays
the limited role of proposing an initial set of hypotheses, which is later reﬁned using deductive techniques.
Also related is the work of Datteri et al. [2], where induction (in machine learning) was understood as a deductive
process; Dateri et al. modeled a typical process of a machine learning inductive algorithm in several steps, and provided a
logical model for each step (that they call “deductive”). The ﬁnal argument was that machine learning inductive algorithms
are then “inductionless,” as every step in the process is a logical inference. Our approach, a non-monotonic logical model of
the whole process of an inductive algorithm, clariﬁes the nature of inductive concept learning: it is a form of defeasible (i.e.
non-deductive) reasoning, similar (albeit not identical) to other forms of defeasible reasoning modeled by non-monotonic
logic.
Concerning the integration of inductive reasoning with other forms of logical reasoning, Michalski [23], in his Inferen-
tial Theory of Learning, started a uniﬁed characterization of all forms of inference (deduction, analogy, induction, etc.) and
deﬁned knowledge transmutation operators. However, those operators were only illustrated with examples, and never com-
pletely formalized. In this paper, we have taken on a smaller task: instead of trying to formalize all types of inference,
we have focused on a very speciﬁc form of inference (inductive generalization), and, in this way, we have managed to
completely characterize it in the form of a consequence relation.
Our approach to model multiagent induction is related to that of merging argumentation systems, which has been
studied by Coste-Marquis et al. [24], where a group of agents, each one having a different argumentation framework (with
potentially inconsistent attack relations) want to merge them. Coste-Marquis et al. proposed to do so by sharing all the
arguments and then letting each agent construct a partial argumentation system where one argument attacks another when
the majority of agents in the group that know both arguments consider there is an attack. After that, agents can merge their
opinions on which arguments are defeated. Notice, however, that in our setting, since we are not dealing with an abstract
argumentation framework and our arguments are actually logical formulas, all agents agree on the attack relation, and thus,
we don’t require such merging procedure.
Arguments and argumentation have been used in a few approaches of machine learning. For instance, arguments are
used in the argument-based machine learning framework [25]; this approach did not employ an argumentation process,
instead it assumed that arguments are given as part of the input of the inductive process, and are exploited by the inductive
algorithm.
Argumentation has been used in the context of multiagent learning in [26]; however, this approach used argumentation
and machine learning as black-boxes that are not integrated, while our logical model of inductive generalization allows for a
deep integration of inductive reasoning and argumentation. Amgoud and Serrurier [27] proposed the use of argumentation
as a framework to formalize the classiﬁcation process, and in particular binary classiﬁcation in the context of concept
learning. The main difference between the work of Amgoud and Serrurier and ours is that they focus on classiﬁcation, i.e.
given an unclassiﬁed example, a set of examples and a set of hypotheses, ﬁnd the classiﬁcation of the new instance together
with an explanation of why such classiﬁcation is provided. Argumentation, in their framework, is used to determine which
possible classiﬁcations (understood as arguments coming from examples or hypotheses) are acceptable, given all the other
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relation on the set of hypothesis for guiding the search in the hypothesis space and to deﬁne the attack relation between
them. In contrast, in our work, we are interested on a logical modeling of the concept learning process itself: the process
through which hypotheses (rules) are generated from a given set of examples. We also use a preference relation, but we
used it to rank the induced rules and the set of inductive theories, rather than to deﬁne the attack relation. In our proposal,
argumentation is only used as a communication framework when multiple agents are involved in the learning process.
Our previous work focused ﬁrst on case-based learning from argumentation-based communication processes [28], where
arguments in the form of both rules and cases were interchanged, but no inductive theory was reached: the agents used
case-based learning plus argumentation to classify unknown examples. Later, as mentioned before, the A-MAIL framework
was the ﬁrst realization of an argumentation-based approach to multiagent induction [9]. The main difference between [9]
and the work presented in this paper is that A-MAIL was a particular implementation that was experimentally validated to
work, in the sense that agents achieved mutually consistent inductive deﬁnitions of a concept by exchanging arguments and
attacks.3 However, there was no formal proof, in [9], that achieving mutually consistent inductive deﬁnitions was always
possible, as we have done in this paper. On the other hand, in this paper we focus on providing theoretical results that
explain why an approach like A-MAIL may achieve coordinated induction using argumentation.
9. Conclusions and future work
This paper presents two main contributions, one being an inductive consequence relation in the framework of non-
monotonic reasoning for inductive concept learning, and the other argumentation-consistent induction, integrating learning
from examples by inductive generalization with learning from argumentation-based communication.
The standard model of non-monotonic reasoning could not be directly applied to our inductive consequence relation. We
needed to relax and reinterpret some of the properties of this model, taking into account that our inductive consequence
relation is deﬁned between two different sets of formulas (examples and rules). Speciﬁcally, Cautious Monotonicity and
Cautious Right Weakening properties maintain the spirit of the standard model properties by reinterpreting them into a
context in which we have two separate sets of formulas.
Furthermore, Proposition 2 presented six additional properties that characterize our inductive consequence relation
which, as we have shown, are the properties speciﬁc to, and anticipated for, inductive concept learning.
The notion of inductive theory, introduced here, is a formalization of the intuitive notion of the output resulting from an
ICL algorithm: a set of formulas that, as a whole, cover and explain all positive examples of the target concept. This notion
allows us to deal with hypothesis selection modeled as preferences over inductive theories, modeling well established
inductive biases such as parsimony and error margin maximization.
Moreover, the notion of inductive theory has allowed us, in the second part of this paper, to integrate the non-
monotonic reasoning process of inductive generalization with another non-monotonic reasoning process, namely argumen-
tation. Argumentation-consistent induction is the key notion in articulating inductive generalization with argumentation:
the rules derived by induction are required to be acceptable inside the argumentation framework. Conceptually, the rules
induced by an agent are learnt not only from examples but from the arguments that are the result of communicating with
another agent.
Finally, argumentation-consistent induction allowed us to prove that a group of agents communicating their induced
rules and performing argumentation would obtain the exact same set of inducible rules as a single agent knowing the
examples known to all agents. Thus, learning directly from examples is equivalent (modulo inductive theory equivalence)
to learning from communication from another agent that also learns from examples. In other words, for two agents or
more, ﬁrst communicating all their examples and then learning by induction is equivalent to ﬁrst learning by induction
individually and then communicating the generalizations they have learnt using argumentation.
In this paper we have centered our analysis on a setting where we assume no noise in the examples, and where we
do not allow induced rules to have any counterexamples. ICL techniques usually accept generalizations that are not 100%
consistent with the set of examples. Our future work will focus on moving from a purely Boolean approach to a graded (or
weighted) approach, where generalizations that are not 100% consistent with the examples can have a degree of acceptabil-
ity. This broader framework would be closer to implemented systems such as A-MAIL [9] that accept induced rules with less
than 100% consistency as long as they are above a given conﬁdence threshold.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Peter Flach for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this manuscript and to
Francesc Esteva for valuable discussions on an earlier manuscript. Research partially funded by the projects Agreement Tech-
nologies (CSD2007-0022), ARINF (TIN2009-14704-C03-03), Next-CBR (TIN2009-13692-C03-01), LoMoReVI (FFI2008-03126-
E/FILO), and by the grants 2009-SGR-1433 and 2009-SGR-1434 of the Generalitat de Catalunya.
3 Speciﬁcally, in [9] we focused on developing and evaluating an inductive algorithm that take into account argument attacks; this algorithm, called ABUI
for argumentation-based bottom-up induction, performs a bottom up search in the space of generalizations to ﬁnd an induced rule from examples such
that is not defeated by the set of known arguments attacking previously induced rules.
146 S. Ontañón et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 193 (2012) 129–148Appendix A. Argumentation-consistent induction for n agents
The main theoretical result of this paper concerning inductive concept learning in multiagent systems is captured in
Theorem 1. Such result states that learning directly from examples is equivalent to learning from communication from
another agent that also learns from examples. In this appendix, we generalize this result for multiagent systems with more
than two agents.
Theorem 3 (Argumentation-consistent induction for n agents). U(
⋃
i=1...n IR(Δi)) = IR(
⋃
i=1...n Δi).
Proof. Notice that by deﬁnition U(IR(Δ)) = IR(Δ); consequently, we have AIR(Δ, IR(Δ)) = IR(Δ).
First, we prove that IR(
⋃
i=1...n Δi) ⊆ U(
⋃
i=1...n IR(Δi)). Let r = α → C be such that r ∈ IR(
⋃
i=1...n Δi), then r covers a
positive example of
⋃
i=1...n Δi and does not cover any negative example of
⋃
i=1...n Δi . W.l.o.g., assume the covered positive
example is from Δk . Then r ∈ IR(Δk). Suppose there exists a rule r′ = β → ¬C ∈ ⋃i=1...n IR(Δi) such that r′  r, i.e. such
that K  β → α. It is clear that r′ /∈ IR(Δk), hence assume r′ ∈ IR(Δ j) for some Δ j , such that j = k. This means r′ covers a
negative example δ− ∈ Δ j , but if r′ covers it, r must cover δ− as well, contradiction.
Second, we prove that IR(
⋃
i=1...n Δi) ⊇ U(
⋃
i=1...n IR(Δi)). Let r = α → C be such that r ∈ U(
⋃
i=1...n IR(Δi)). W.l.o.g.,
assume r ∈ IR(Δk). Then r covers a positive example of Δk and does not cover any negative example of Δk . Assume
also, looking for a contradiction, that r /∈ IR(⋃i=1...n Δi). Since we have assumed that r ∈ IR(Δk), this means that r cov-
ers a negative example of some Δ j . This negative example can be specialized to a rule r′ = β → ¬C ∈ IR(Δ j) such that
K  β → α. Since r′ is the specialization of an example in Δ j and ⋃i=1...n Δi is consistent, the rule r′ is undefeated. Con-
sequently, r /∈ U(⋃i=1...n IR(Δi)), which contradicts our original assumption. Therefore we can conclude IR(
⋃
i=1...n Δi) ⊇
U(
⋃
i=1...n IR(Δi)). 
Appendix B. Flach’s general approach to inductive consequence relations
In their seminal paper [7] Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM) study “general patterns of non-monotonic reasoning and
try to isolate properties that could help us map the ﬁeld of non-monotonic reasoning by reference to positive properties.”
Following Gabbay [14], KLM focus their study at the level of consequence relations and choose a Gentzen-style notation
of axiom schemata and inference rules to express structural properties of a consequence relation that could adequately
represent a non-monotonic logic.
Based on the KLM framework, Flach [1,5] studies the process of inductive hypothesis formation from two perspectives:
ﬁnding general rules that explain given speciﬁc evidence (explanatory induction), and ﬁnding general rules that are conﬁrmed
by the evidence (conﬁrmatory induction). Both forms of hypothesis formation are axiomatized also at the level of consequence
relations, providing a set of rationality postulates for various forms of induction.
For Flach, an inductive consequence relation |∼ is a set of pairs of formulas, α |∼ β meaning that “β is a possible
inductive hypothesis given evidence α.” Inductive consequence relations are intended to model the behavior of inductive
agents. Flach does not ﬁx a particular deﬁnition of |∼, he studies rationality postulates limiting different possible deﬁnitions.
He starts with a set of general principles for induction and then presents speciﬁc sets of principles for each type of induction
(explanatory and conﬁrmatory).
Since our consequence relation |∼K is deﬁned between two different sets of formulas (examples and rules), most of these
properties do not directly apply to our setting. Nevertheless, it is interesting to check whether the Flach’s general principles
(listed below) underlying these properties hold for |∼K .
1. Veriﬁcation (a predicted observation veriﬁes the hypothesis)
 α ∧ β → γ , α |∼ β
α ∧ γ |∼ β
2. Falsiﬁcation (an observation, the negation of which was predicted, falsiﬁes the hypothesis)
 α ∧ β → γ , α |∼ β
α ∧ ¬γ |∼ β
3. Left Logical Equivalence (the logical form of the evidence is immaterial)
 α ↔ β, α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
4. Right Logical Equivalence (the logical form of the hypothesis is immaterial)
 β ↔ γ , α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
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α |∼ β
α |∼ α
6. Right Reﬂexivity (any hypothesis allowed by some evidence is admissible)
α |∼ β
β |∼ β
7. Right Extension (any hypothesis can be extended with a prediction)
 α ∧ β → γ , α |∼ β
α |∼ β ∧ γ
In order to check the validity of these general principles in our ICL framework, we need ﬁrst to set out how to interpret
Flach’s consequence relation |∼ in terms of our inductive consequence relation |∼K , taking into account our restricted
language of rules and examples. Indeed, in an expression α |∼ β we interpret the evidence α as a set of (both positive and
negative) examples Δ for a concept C , and the hypothesis β as a rule (∀x)(ϕ(x) → C(x)).
In this setting, we provide the following justiﬁcations and propose an adapted form of these principles to our framework:
1. Veriﬁcation: interpreting a predicted observation as a new positive example γ (a)∧ C(a) already covered by an induced
rule β → C from a set of examples Δ, the principle holds by Property 3 of Proposition 2 (Positive monotonicity).
K  γ → β, Δ |∼K β → C
Δ∪ {γ (a)∧ C(a)} |∼K β → C
2. Falsiﬁcation: with the same interpretation as in the previous item, a new negative example γ (a)∧¬C(a) is not covered
by an induced rule β → C from Δ when γ (a)∧ C(a) was already covered by β → C . That is,
K  γ → β, Δ |∼K β → C
Δ∪ {γ (a)∧ ¬C(a)} |∼K β → C
This follows by the very deﬁnition of the inductive consequence relation |∼K .
3. Left Logical Equivalence: if Δ |∼K α → C and Δ ≡K Δ′ , then Δ′ |∼K α → C . This directly follows from Property 2 in
Proposition 1.
Δ |∼K α → C, Δ ≡K Δ′
Δ′ |∼K α → C
4. Right Logical Equivalence: if K  β ↔ α and Δ |∼K α → C , then Δ |∼K β → C . This directly follows from Property 3 in
Proposition 1.
K  β ↔ α, Δ |∼K α → C
Δ |∼K β → C
5. Left Reﬂexivity: if Δ |∼K β → C for some rule β → C , this means that Δ is consistent, and hence, for every α(a)∧C(a) ∈
Δ, we have {α(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K α → C . This follows from Property 1 of Proposition 1.
Δ |∼K β → C, α(a)∧ C(a) ∈ Δ
{α(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K α → C
6. Right Reﬂexivity: if Δ |∼K β → C for some set of examples Δ, for every example β(a)∧ C(a), we have {β(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K
β → C . This follows from Property 1 of Proposition 1.
Δ |∼K β → C
{β(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K β → C
7. Right Extension: if Δ |∼K β → C , by deﬁnition of covering, there must exist a positive example α(a) ∧ C(a) ∈ Δ such
that  α → β . Assuming  α ∧ β → γ , we have that  α → β ∧ γ . Since Δ is assumed to be consistent, β ∧ γ cannot
cover any negative example, and consequently Δ |∼K β ∧ γ → C .
Δ |∼K β → C, {α(a)∧ C(a)} |∼K β → C, ∧  α ∧ β → γ
Δ |∼K β ∧ γ → C
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